We develop techniques to optimise the locations and surveillance scheduling of tower-mounted camera systems used by a military force in an urban setting. Using a game-theoretic foundation, we seek to minimise expected damage from attacks or other adversarial events (e.g., emplacements of improvised explosive devices). Assuming that at most one camera may surveil a single point of interest (POI) at any time, a mixed-integer program uses an additive-probability model to optimise the placement of towers, while allocating 'aggregate, normalised surveillance time' between cameras and POIs. Linear-programming-based column generation then creates a probability distribution for camera-to-POI assignments to define implementable schedules. We prove that such schedules must exist, making the additive probability model exact. Computational examples on realistically sized problems produce high-quality solutions quickly, with quality suffering only when the number of cameras available nears the number of POIs to be surveilled. We show that an alternative game-theoretic model may produce better solutions when such a situation arises.
Introduction
This paper develops and tests models for optimally locating a set of camera towers used for surveillance of an urban area during a military conflict. We build on Salmeron and Wood (2015) who develop models that minimise the damage caused by undetected random or adversarial attacks at surveilled 'point of interests' (POIs). We overcome the key limitation of that work, the assumption of a fixed assignment of cameras to POIs, by also scheduling 'surveillance sessions' with various camera-to-POI assignments.
Using Salmeron and Wood's (2015) adversarial paradigm, we first develop a model to optimise tower locations using an objective that evaluates aggregate, normalised camera-to-POI assignment times. We go on to show that: a a post-processing algorithm can produce an implementable session schedule whose long-term coverage matches those aggregate values b the complete procedure can be carried out efficiently using standard software and hardware.
In essence, the camera schedule is a probability distribution over surveillance sessions, which is to be implemented as a Monte Carlo simulation. Thus, our paper concerns itself with efficient simulation, but in a less standard fashion than do papers covering, say, efficient 'mechanics' of a simulation (e.g., Gillespie, 2001; Chen and Yucesan, 2005) , efficient statistical tests to optimise the design of a simulated system (e.g., Nelson et al., 2001) , or efficient optimisation of a simulated system (e.g., Fu et al., 2005; Jafferali et al., 2005) . Examples of tower-based surveillance systems include 'ground-based operational surveillance system' (GBOSS) and base expeditionary targeting and surveillance systems-combined (BETSS-C). These systems have been used in Iraq and Afghanistan by coalition forces to help thwart the emplacement of improvised explosive devices (Defense Industry Daily, 2015) . They can also help identify other events to which forces should respond, e.g., armed attacks, riots, sightings of suspicious vehicles; for simplicity, we refer to all such events as 'attacks'. In addition to camera towers, low-altitude aerostats (tethered blimps) could also be included in the set of modelled surveillance assets. Murray et al. (2007) develop a model, similar to facility-location model, to identify the best subset of potential locations to place a limited number of surveillance cameras. Their objective function ignores probabilities of detection and simply tries to maximise the weighted number of POIs that can be surveilled. Using a similar physical setting, Salmeron and Wood (2015) develop several models that do account for detection probabilities, which may vary by distance between tower and POI and by other factors. However, neither of these deals with the actual scheduling of surveillance sessions. Scheduling could be critical given that the total number of POIs that should be surveilled may exceed the number of available cameras.
The current paper takes camera scheduling into account, while still beginning with the solution to a static model for optimising 'facility locations'. This model, a mixed-integer program (MIP), locates towers and determines the fraction of time that a camera at a particular location should surveil each POI. The MIP assumes a game-theoretic environment of an 'attacker-defender model' (Brown et al., 2006) . In particular, a single attacker, who will carry out attacks over time, understands: a the value that the defender places on the various POIs b the defender's nominal probability of detecting an attack at a POI from any potential tower location.
While these worst-case assumptions may seem strong, they are appropriate for a military setting in which a central authority directs attacks (and another central authority directs defences). A model that minimises 'average damage' would require even stronger assumptions: the defender would also need to know the frequency with which attacks will occur at each POI. We do briefly develop in the body of the paper, however, an average-damage variant of our techniques, which might apply in a civilian setting.
Our tower-location model does have some similarities with certain camera-placement models which, in turn, resemble certain facility-location models. Bodor et al. (2007) address the problem of camera placement for maximum observability of moving subjects in a given area, and introduce a joint measure of observability with quality of the view. Their optimisation in terms of the 'motion statistics of a scene' resembles the optimisation of facility locations over an empirical probability distribution of customer demands. [See the survey paper on stochastic facility-location models by Snyder (2006) .] Hörster and Lienhart (2006) address a problem involving both coverage and resolution of images, accounting for cost of operations and effectiveness of a set of cameras with orientation-dependent effectiveness. They develop a number of models, but at least one has a strong flavour of a deterministic facility-location model. [See the survey paper on deterministic facility-location models by Owen and Daskin (1998) .] In particular, variables determine whether a camera is placed at particular location and with a particular orientation (cf. facility operations), and with rewards that depend on whether a particular POI is covered by (cf. served by) a camera. In summary, our basic model has some similarities with certain camera-location and facility-location models, but our adversarial objective function appears to be unique.
Although our problem involves surveillance and scheduling, it shares few similarities with the topic often referred to in the literature as surveillance scheduling. This topic involves the coordination of one or more cameras to surveil one or more moving targets (e.g., Costello and Wang, 2005; Qureshi and Terzopoulos, 2006; Krahnstoever et al., 2008; Natarajan et al., 2012; Jänen et al., 2013) . Surveillance-scheduling models assume a fixed set of camera locations, so they cannot help us with optimally locating camera towers. These models may seek to maximise a probabilistic function such as the expected number of targets recognised -superficially, this might resemble our objective, which measures expected damage from attacks -but surveillance scheduling always models a stochastic environment with no adversarial characteristics. In summary, we find no useful connections between 'surveillance scheduling' and the camera-to-POI scheduling that we require.
We design our foundational tower-location model to identify aggregate, normalised camera-to-POI surveillance times -no scheduling is involved yet -because a model that combines location and scheduling would be complicated and might solve too slowly for practical use. In effect, a solution to the tower-location model identifies marginal probabilities for a camera-scheduling distribution, a distribution we prove to exist under reasonable assumptions. Of course, we also describe a method for computing such a distribution. To establish correctness, this effort employs the theory exploited by Liu et al. (2005) to solve a 'maximal lifetime sensor-scheduling problem'. For a survey of related sensor-scheduling problems, see Section 4.2 in Wang (2011) , but note that the techniques described there lack the game-theoretic foundations of our techniques.
The current paper is based on, but diverges substantially from, a conference paper, Salmeron and Wood (2015) . In particular, the current paper: a omits details of a supporting database b emphasises an adversarial, game-theoretic environment c adds a new model and mathematical derivation d develops a completely new scheduling paradigm and algorithm, along with validating theoretical results e demonstrates the computational behaviour of our models and algorithms using new software implementations and test problems.
A MIP for locating camera towers
This section develops a MIP to identify the best subset of potential locations to place a limited number of camera towers. The MIP assigns cameras to POIs for surveillance, and determines the fraction of time, called 'aggregate, normalised time', that each camera will be tasked with surveilling each POI to which it is assigned. Using an additive model of detection probability, the objective function seeks to minimise the maximum expected cost of damage from any attack that goes undetected. Here, 'limited number of camera towers' simply implies that a collection of towers is an expensive, limited resource that places demands on other limited resources such as operating personnel. 'Potential locations' reflect a limited number of sites that have good viewsheds and that have or could have acceptable security, for example, existing or planned command posts, respectively. The MIP and subsequent scheduling algorithm ignore the fact that some surveillance time will be lost in switching from one camera-to-POI assignment to another. We believe this to be reasonable, because it should require only few seconds to change a camera's angle, declination and focus to shift surveillance from one POI to another, and because we expect a given assignment to be maintained for several minutes.
Minimising worst-case expected damage
Using an additive model of detection probability and assuming that all camera towers are identical, the MIP below, MX1, minimises the maximum (i.e., worst-case) expected damage from an undetected attack. Section 2.2 provides the game-theoretic interpretation of this model. ( 1 ) subject to:
Indices and index sets
,
The objective function (1), together with constraints (2), minimises the worst case of an approximate expected damage function for undetected attacks across all POIs. Constraint (3) limits the number camera towers being located and installed to the number available n T . Constraints (4) ensure that the total, normalised surveillance time from each camera equals the time available. Constraints (5) ensure that the total normalised time assigned to surveilling a particular POI does not exceed 1; this approximates the requirement that no more than a single camera surveil a POI at any time. Constraints (6) insist that no surveillance time be allocated from camera c to POI i unless that camera is assigned explicitly to that POI. Taking advantage of (6), constraints (7) limit the number of POIs that can be surveilled from a single tower; these constraints reflect the limited capabilities of human operators and the loss of effectiveness that would arise if a single camera had to constantly switch focus from one POI to another. Constraints (8) require that cameras on a single, installed tower be assigned to different POIs. Constraints (9) to (11) limit the variables' domains.
For notational simplicity, we assume that every POI i ∈ I can be usefully surveilled from every potential tower location . ∈ L In practice, the distance between a location and a POI, or the lack of a line of sight, may make surveillance of little or no value between certain pairs (i, ℓ), and the implemented model can be simplified by taking that into account.
We note that MX1 does not distinguish one camera on a tower from another. Thus, the model may exhibit a great deal of symmetry in potential solutions, a symmetry that will grow with increasing values of n C/T . This could reduce the efficiency of a branch-and-bound solution algorithm and necessitate the application of some symmetry-breaking constructs. With few exceptions, however, reasonably large test instances solve easily, so we do not pursue this issue.
Game-theoretic interpretation of MX1
This section presents the game-theoretic interpretation of MX1. In this interpretation, the tower-location model includes both the decision vector y for tower locations and the decision vector for camera-to-POI assignments . y Given those decisions, the defender and attacker engage in a simultaneous-play game with decision vectors f and φ:
a with probability f ci , the defender surveils POI i ∈ I with camera
The model has this formulation: , * : min min max 1
subject to: (3) to (11), and
MX1 formally derives from MMX1 by fixing y, y and f, taking the dual of the resulting linear program and then releasing the fixed variables. Given this derivation, a standard game-theory result applies to obtain the optimal attack probabilities φ * : these are the optimal dual variables for constraints (2) in the linear program that appears after fixing y = y * and * . = y y
Minimising average damage
We have advocated, in the context of a military conflict, for scheduling urban surveillance to minimise maximum expected damage. The reason is that attacks in this context are likely to be guided by a central authority and, thus, the game-theoretic model of two adversaries with directly competing goals is credible. In a peacetime urban setting, however, attacks could represent independent street crimes. Historical data may then justify the modelling of attacks at each POI as a Poisson process with known rate (Braga and Bond, 2008) . Such modelling yields a fixed probability of attack ˆi φ for each POI , i ∈ I and we could create the following optimisation model to minimise the average damage from attacks across all POIs: , , : mîn 1
( 1 5 ) subject to: (3) to (11). Camera towers may be irrelevant in a peacetime urban setting, however. Rather, we expect this setting to involve an existing collection of cameras on fixed mounts, with each camera aimed at a 'fixed scene'. (In some cases, the camera and scene can be adjusted in real-time to better monitor suspicious activity, but 'fixed scene' would be a reasonable modelling assumption.) Human observers monitor the scenes on video screens for 'attacks', with this monitoring limited by human ability and available screens. Because the number of cameras may exceed the number that can be monitored effectively (Neil et al., 2007) , efficient scheduling of that monitoring could be important. Thus, we believe that a model related to AVG1, along with a schedule-producing algorithm like the one described next, could be useful in a peacetime urban setting. Because of our interest in military applications, however, we do not pursue this topic. In turn, this implies that the additive probability approximation that MX1 uses in (2) is exact. To show that such scheduling is possible, we employ the theory outlined in Liu et al. (2005) , but in a much condensed fashion. We create a much simpler schedule-generating algorithm, also.
Let g k be a 0-1 vector that represents the k th possible assignment of cameras * ∈ c C to POIs . i ∈ I That is, g kci = 1 if camera * ∈ c C views POI i ∈ I in assignment k, and g kci = 0, otherwise; 'at most one camera per POI' implies that 0 kci kc i g g ′ = ⋅ for all k, i and c ≠ c′. (For notational simplicity below, we allow assignments k with g kci = 1 for * , c C ∈ even though * 0. 
If condition (a) is true, summing all constraints (17) gives ** | |, | | k k∈ = ∑ α K C C which means that condition (b) will hold automatically. Assuming ** SKED 0, z = the installed cameras are scheduled very simply then: every pre-specified interval of time (e.g., every 10 minutes), create a new surveillance session by, according to the probability distribution α ** , randomly selecting and applying some assignment g k .
If a valid distribution exists, we can find it by solving ( ) SKED K using a standard, linear-programming-based column-generation algorithm (Gilmore and Gomory, 1961) , provided that the algorithm does not cycle. The algorithm follows: 
Of course, the assignment problem (19) to (22) solves efficiently using combinatorial or linear-programmingbased techniques [e.g., Ahuja et al., (1993), pp.470-473] .
To show that ( ) SKED K has an optimal solution with s ** = 0, we use the following standard definitions:
A permutation matrix P k G is an n × n 0-1 matrix with exactly one 1 in each row and column.
An assignment matrix A k G is an m × n 0-1 matrix, m ≤ n, with exactly one 1 in each row and at most one 1 in each column.
A (singly) stochastic matrix F SS is an m × n non-negative real matrix, m ≤ n, with each row sum being 1 an each column sum being at most 1.
A doubly stochastic matrix F DS is an n × n non-negative real matrix each of whose row and column sums is 1.
Lemma 1: An n × n doubly stochastic matrix F DS can be written as a convex combination of the n × n permutation matrices , , A k
So, now assume that m < n for F SS . Using Lemma 2, add nm rows i, i = m + 1, …, n with appropriate entries to extend this matrix to a doubly stochastic matrix F DS . From Lemma 1, we know that a convex combination of the n × n permutation matrices , , P k P k G ∈ K must exist. Find such a convex combination, that is, find α ** satisfying
Deleting the last nm constraints in (23) shows that the convex combination required by the theorem exists. ■ Lemma 4: Any m × m stochastic matrix F SS with m ≤ n can be written as a convex combination of the set of all m × n assignment matrices , .
A k A k G ∈ K Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 3, the case of m = n is trivially true. Thus, assume m < n and let (23)′ denote the subset of constraints (23) that remain after the last (row-deletion) step in that proof. We know that vector α ** applied to the system (23)′, (24), (25) defines a convex combination of assignment matrices, although some of these matrices will be duplicates. Collecting like terms in this system yields the desired result. ■ Theorem 1: ( ) SKED K has an optimal solution (α ** , s ** ) with s ** = 0
Proof: This theorem's statement is equivalent to that of Lemma 4, with the stochastic matrix F SS being represented as the vector f * and the assignment matrices , Proof: This follows from:
a Theorem 1 which proves that a valid distribution exists b the fact that GenDist just implements a special version of the simplex algorithm for solving a linear program c the simplex algorithm always converges unless it cycles. ■
In practice, we find that GenDist converges in a modest number of steps, and thus no anti-cycling techniques are required.
[For examples of anti-cycling techniques that might be applied if needed, see Gill et al. (1989) and the references therein.]
Computational results
Using simulated scenarios, this section investigates the empirical behaviour of our procedure for locating camera towers and scheduling surveillance sessions for the cameras on those towers. The computation also validates our methods in a self-evident fashion by:
a providing empirical evidence of the correctness of Section 3's theory b substantiating our claim that the procedure consisting of model MX1 and the algorithm GenDist solves realistic problems efficiently enough for practical applications using standard hardware and software c identifying extreme parameter ranges for which MX1 produces poor results or must fail d exploring an alternative camera-location model for such parameter ranges.
Computational environment
We generate all mathematical programs using the standard modelling system GAMS (version 23.3.3), and solve them with CPLEX (version 12.6.0.1). A Lenovo W541 laptop computer carries out all computations, running at 2.9 GHz and using 16 GB of RAM. All MIPs are solved using a relative optimality tolerance of 1%, subject to a time limit of 1,000 seconds.
Scenario description
We model a square study region with each side having a length of 100 in arbitrary units. Two 'geographical scenarios' apply, a medium-sized one 'M' and a large-sized one 'L'. The former has 15 candidate locations and 60 POIs and the latter has 30 and 120, respectively. The x-and y-coordinates for all of these are randomly chosen according to a uniform distribution over the study region. Letting D ℓi denote the distance between ℓ and i, and letting 30, D = both geographical scenarios use
The reduction in p ℓi with 2 i D − reflects reduced resolution of an image on a rectangular screen with a given number of pixels as camera-to-POI distance increases (Bodor et al., 2007) .
We further create 32 complete 'test scenarios' from the geographical scenarios M and L, by using variants of: a damage values (either selected according to a discrete uniform distribution over d i ∈ {1, …, 5}∀i or set as d i = 1∀i) b number of potential tower locations n T ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20}, depending on the geographical scenario c number of cameras per tower n C/T ∈ {1, …, 12}, depending on other parameters. Table 1 describes the set of test scenarios. For example, M5/10/3 indicates a medium-sized geographical scenario that is completed by specifying d i ∈{1, …, 5}∀i, n T = 10 and n C/T = 3. 
Test scenario results
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the medium-and large-sized test scenarios, respectively. In addition to the optimal objective value * , z MX1 the tables list: | |, ′ K the total number of assignment vectors that are generated; | |, ′′ K the number of those vectors with positive weight in the optimal scheduling distribution α * ; Δ avg , the average number of individual camera-to-POI assignments that change in transitioning from one session to another; Δ max the maximum number of such changes that can occur; and 'Time' which gives the total elapsed seconds used to solve MX1 and execute GenDist. We note that each row in these tables represents only a single, randomly generated instance. Our computational experience indicates that, while optimal objective values may vary greatly among randomly generated instances, the conclusions reached on computational behaviour do not change across the range of parameters displayed.
We conclude from Tables 2 and 3 that MX1 and GenDist typically produce good schedules quickly, with probabilities of detection that increase sensibly as n C/T increases. We also note that | |, ′ K the number of assignments generated, tracks well with total solution time. Thus, this value seems to give a good implementation-independent measure of the difficulty of solving a particular model instance. Tables 2 and 3 also show, however, that the methodology is imperfect: when the number of towers is small or the best set of towers has poor geographical coverage, improvement in expected damage can stall as n C/T increases; for example, see M1/5/n C/T for n C/T ≥ 10. Because expected damage does not stall as n C/T increases for the large-sized scenarios reported in Table 3 , we conclude that a high-quality solution requires a good geographical dispersion of potential tower locations.
GenDist never generates more than 600 camera-to-POI assignments, and the number used in a schedule (i.e., having positive probability) never exceeds 120. The only result that may seem unfortunate is that the average number of changes in POI surveillance in moving from one assignment to another, Δ avg , is a large fraction of the maximum number that might occur, Δ max . For example, the schedule for test scenario M5/5/4 surveils 20 POIs simultaneously but, on average over half of the POIs being surveilled (i.e., 10.2) change from one session to the next. Table 3 Computational results for large-sized scenarios 
Many cameras: an alternative model
As the total number of cameras available n C/T • n T starts to approach the number of POIs | |, L focusing two or more cameras on distinct towers upon a single POI might improve detection probabilities and reduce expected damage. This could alleviate some of the stalling of the expected-damage values seen going down the rows of Table 2 . Assuming independent detections, and requiring that each camera be permanently assigned to some POI, the following model applies MX1's game-theoretic paradigm (Salmeron and Wood, 2015) : 
MX2 linearises easily, of course, and we solve that linearised version in practice. Constraints (29) are not required, but they may tighten the model's continuous relaxation and reduce solution times. Note also that the fixed camera-to-POI assignments assumed in MX2 alleviate the need for a secondary scheduling algorithm and any related theory. For testing, we fix n T = 5, and vary n C/T from 1 to 8 in 'small-sized scenarios' defined to have | | 9 = L and | | 30. = I Following the nomenclature above, Sd/n T /n C/T = Sd/5/n C/T denotes instances of these scenarios. We use small-sized scenarios because certain larger instances of MX2 can be difficult to solve. Also, to avoid scenarios in which expected damage drops abruptly to nearly 0, we reduce D to 20. Table 4 compares the behaviour of MX1 and MX2. Consider first the eight instances with d i = 1 for all POIs i. The 'fixed-assignment system' represented by MX2 must leave some POIs unsurveilled when 1 ≤ n C/T ≤ 5, and hence, the initial collection of 1s in column 4. By contrast, the 'variable-assignment system' represented by MX1 can spend some time surveilling every POI in those scenarios and reduce expected damage below 1. But then, because of the requirement for the MX1-based solution that no POI be surveilled simultaneously by two or more cameras, the value of adding more cameras to available towers trails off and may stop improving as the total number of cameras becomes large; of course, the model becomes infeasible once that number exceeds | |. I When n C/T = 6, the total number of cameras equals | |, I and thus exactly one camera can be assigned to each POI in either model to reduce expected damage below 1. The optimal objective values for the two models are therefore identical. For n C/T > 6, MX2 can assign two or more cameras from separate towers to some POIs in order to continue reducing expected damage. In these cases, however, the variable-assignment system based on MX1 simply becomes infeasible, given the requirement that no two cameras surveil the same POI simultaneously. For the scenarios with d i ∈ {1, …, 5} the fixed-assignment system (MX2) must leave some POIs unsurveilled, and the worst damage from an unsurveilled POI defines the expected damage of 5, 3 or 3, when n C/T = 1, 2 or 3, respectively. However, when n C/T = 4, some POIs remain unsurveilled, but the expected damage of 2.4735 is defined by a POI that is, in fact, surveilled. When n C/T = 5, we see that the fixed-assignment system outperforms the variable-assignment system, even though some POIs must be left unsurveilled. This happens because the fixed-assignment system can assign at least one camera to every POI i with d i > 2 and, where that does not suffice to bring the worst-case expected damage down sufficiently, that reduction can be achieved by assigning two or more cameras to certain 'high-value POIs' (i.e., POIs i with d i ≥ 3). Thus, when nominal damage values vary, the fixed-assignment system can outperform the variable-assignment system even when some POIs must be left unsurveilled.
We remind the reader of the strong assumption of independent detections made in developing the results above. The apparent superiority of the fixed-assignment system modelled by MX2, for certain parameter settings, might not be realisable in practice.
Conclusions
We have demonstrated a method for optimally locating a set of surveillance-camera towers and then scheduling surveillance of 'POIs' by installed cameras. The model seeks to minimise worst-case expected damage from attacks or other events in an adversarial setting. A key assumption applies: at most one camera may surveil a POI at any time.
By using a two-step process, we create a solution technique that solves quickly enough on a laptop computer for practical use. First, the solution to a facility-location-like model identifies camera locations that optimise aggregate, normalised, camera-to-POI assignment times. Then, a linear-programming-based column-generation algorithm produces a probability distribution for camera-to-POI assignments -each with at most one camera per POIwhose marginal probabilities match the normalised, aggregate assignment times. We prove that this solution must be optimal and show that it is achievable in practice.
When the total number of cameras becomes large compared to the number of POIs, we also demonstrate the potential benefits a tower-location model that uses a fixed assignment of cameras to POIs. Specifically, each camera surveils a single POI, but two or more cameras may surveil a POI, provided that those cameras are mounted on separate towers. The fixed-assignment model may reduce expected damage as the total number of cameras grows, but that result depends strongly on: a the variation across POIs of the nominal damage associated with a successful attack b the assumption of independent detections among cameras surveilling the same POI from different locations.
These issues will require further research. Our general topic area has numerous opportunities for additional research involving simulation. For instance, surveillance cameras can detect riots, but simulation of human behaviour in this context might lead to methods that can detect and help stop a riot at the earliest possible stage (Bruzzone et al., 2011; Lacko et al., 2013) . Also, if we relax some of the assumptions required of our optimisations models -suppose simultaneous attacks at multiple locations can occur -then the models' results could be viewed as approximate solutions that need to be verified or modified through simulation studies; for example, see Schriber and Stecke (1987) and Wiese et al. (2009) .
